In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3-5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.
Introduction
An argument is logically valid if its conclusion necessarily follows from its premises. From a normative standpoint, the logical status of an argument is determined exclusively by its structure. Nevertheless, it is well known that other factors routinely influence peoples' judgments of argument validity. One of the most important of these is the extent to which the conclusion of an argument conforms with a person's pre-existing view of the world. People tend to be easily persuaded by invalid arguments that fit their beliefs yet are likely to resist valid arguments that oppose their beliefs. This phenomenon is known as belief bias (Wilkins, 1928) .
Numerous psychological theories have been developed to account for belief bias in syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003) . Mental model theory (MMT; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989) holds that people construct mental models to simulate the components of an argument. When faced with unbelievable conclusions, they engage in a more thorough search for alternative models, improving the likelihood of arriving at the normatively correct conclusion. Selective processing theory (SPT; Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000) posits that reasoning strategy depends on conclusion believability: people attempt to confirm believable conclusions but disconfirm unbelievable ones. According to dual process theories like those described by Evans (2007) , unbelievable conclusions may recruit additional, reflective processing. All of these theories suggest that conclusion believability can influence the quality of reasoning. However, it is also http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.009 0010-0277/Ó 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
